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Abstract 
Institutions are the rules of the game, generating certain incentives for agents who adapt their behavior accordingly. The electoral 
system is the institution that transforms individual preferences into collective decisions, but the way in which it performs this
function differs. Such differences may result in different collective decisions even when individual preferences are similar. The
relation between voting rules and redistribution provides an illustration for this phenomenon. Even when accounting for various
country characteristics and social preferences, proportional systems seem to spend more on redistribution. The explanation lies in 
the different incentives created by the voting rules, namely the size of electoral districts and the type of public spending they 
encourage. 
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1. Institutions and preferences 
Democracy is often understood as government in accordance to the general will. Citizens have the right to decide 
over matters that belong to the public sphere and the only source for collective decisions is their will. This is indeed 
sound as a principle, but what exactly do we mean by general will? How do we define “the people” and more 
importantly, how do we know what it wants, its general will?  
This is where institutions come into play, that is, “the relatively stable patterns in public choice settings that formally 
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or informally define constraints on and opportunities for individual behaviour in that setting". They themselves a 
matter of choice at the outset, these institutions, once established, start to function as a set of boundaries within 
which behaviour can materialize. 
This is the key in which democracy is approached at a deeper, more concrete level. The members of society have 
conflicting preferences on various issues and try to advance their options and defeat the others’. More specifically, 
an approximation of their positions is taken up by candidates for public office who then try to pursue the goals of 
their voters. From the very beginning one can notice an abundance of potential problems. Who votes for whom, who 
gets to govern and many other questions arise.   
Voting systems perform this exact function. They transform, following certain rules, the “will” of the people into 
effective power for decision making. These rules try to identify an approximation that is close enough to the 
principle of democracy as possible but continues to be applicable in practice. 
What will be explored in this paper is the extent to which these rules of aggregation of individual preferences into 
collective decisions get to influence the decisions themselves. In other words, whether in any two countries (for lack 
of other units with available data) with similar preferences, decisions tend to be different (also) because of the rules 
used to transform preferences into decision.  
These rules vary significantly across democracies. Leaving aside the details that make up the electoral system (the 
whole process of running for office and casting ballots), there are a few essential features where the differences 
typically lie. Of them, the magnitude of districts, the number of seats associated to a geographical unit, is perhaps 
the most interesting given the consequences it generates. This will represent the central point of the causal 
mechanism discussed in this paper.  
For an illustration for this phenomenon, one of the most important categories of public decisions will be chosen, 
namely redistribution. It will be argued that the difference in the “generosity” of social policies (used 
interchangeably with redistribution, though not exactly the same) may be explained by the voting rules and not only 
by the preferences of the people actually voting.  
To do this, a set of additional variables will be introduced in the famous model of Persson and Tabellini, which will 
act as approximations for country level preferences towards social policy. The preferences variables will be 
extracted from the World Values Survey, where available, and will be interpreted, for lack of better and more 
comparable data, as the society’s views on redistribution.  
What will be sought is to show, with the data and tools available, that even when accounting for what people want, 
the way their “wants” are aggregated continues to matter in explaining the decision that actually gets to be taken at 
government level.  
The paper will start with a brief theoretical overview of institutionalism and the interaction between behavior and 
institutions. It will then discuss about the example used as illustration, namely voting rules and redistribution with 
reference to the model of Thorsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. Next, their model will be presented and modified to 
include additional control variables, the ones seen as proxies for societal preferences. In the end, conclusions will be 
attempted. 
2. Voting rules incentives and redistribution 
An intellectual current that started in the 1980s in economics and political science has gained mainstream 
acceptance. Broadly speaking, institutionalism, came as a new paradigm that started looking at the constraints on 
decision-makers, on all levels, in contexts of choice. This brought about a new fascination with the details of the 
workings of institutions, parliaments and committees, and so on. It became the norm to say that “institutions 
matter”, and their study was comprehensive. The origins and causes of particular institutional settings, their 
functioning and minutiae, but also their consequences came to be objects of intense research. 
For the purpose of this paper, institutions will be understood as “the humanly constructed rules of the game”, in the 
words of Douglas North, taken as exogenous, serving as the limits within which agents, “abiding by the rules, bring 
particular preferences to a situation” or “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” 
As Kenneth Shepsle puts it, institutions can be seen in a generalized abstract way as follows: 
“An institution specifies the players whose behaviour is bound by its rules; the actions the players must, may, must 
not, or may not take; the informational conditions under which they make choices; their timing; the impact of 
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exogenous events; and the outcomes that are a consequence of these choices and events. The game form is 
transformed into a game when players are endowed with preferences over outcomes”. 
The game in our particular case is democracy in its broad sense and its operational expression, namely elections.  Its 
rules, diverse as they may be, set the context for actors to participate, the conditions, algorithms and methods that 
have as inputs the preferences of voters and as outputs a distribution of seats in a representative body. These rules 
provide a certain set of incentives to participants to the game, both voters and candidates. 
As these rules differ between countries (or systems in general), the incentives also differ, which can be expected to 
lead to difference also in the results of the game. In other words, the definition of the rules of elections, i.e., 
expression of preference, can influence outcomes even in cases where the distribution of preferences is similar. 
Not unlike pluralism, institutionalism acknowledges the relative strength of particular interest groups within society 
as the source for power, but sees institutions as interfering with this distribution of strengths and altering it enough 
as to be able to modify the results. 
The variation in certain public policies is a fertile ground for bringing institutions into discussion. After all, if there 
are countries where some fundamental policies differ significantly and this difference seems to follow institutional 
patterns, other things being equal, one can meaningfully argue that that the incentives structure embedded in the 
institutional design can be seen as a plausible explanation.  
This is the line of thought followed in the literature on health policy. There are countries where one can hardly 
notice a significant difference in the preferences of the people, or any other important variable such as public 
finances for that matter, but that chose widely different solutions for their public health systems. Sweden, France 
and the United Kingdom were found as a good illustration for this phenomenon. The different institutional patterns 
gave way to behaviour from the politicians that made certain policies more suitable choice. 
The case of social policy is striking. Being relatively simple to measure, as one can sum up all spending on social 
programs and divide the result by a country’s GDP, redistribution can be compared and linked with various 
determinants. Doing this, one can notice that countries with proportional systems have more generous welfare 
systems than the ones with majoritarian systems. Is that merely a coincidence? 
Persson and Tabellini dedicate their entire book to answering this question. Both theoretically and empirically, they 
showed that the difference in incentives is large enough to be considered responsible for the difference in the long 
term policy result of voting systems. 
The theoretical argument focuses on one fundamental distinction between proportional and majoritarian systems, 
namely the magnitude of districts. It is argued that the difference between how elections are actually won explains 
the difference in incentives.  
In proportional systems, the winner needs the support of a majority of voters. When it comes to redistribution, voters 
can be ranked according to their preference with the left (relatively less well off individuals) being in favour of 
taxing the wealthier individuals and sharing the benefits in the form of social programs. The right prefers avoiding 
taxes altogether if possible, as very little of the accumulated revenue of the state is spent on programs benefitting 
them directly. The battle between the two sides can be won by even the slightest changes in the equilibrium between 
them. The swing voters, i.e., the ones that do not have a strong preference for any of the options become the target 
for candidates, as they are easiest to convince. As every such vote counts, parties try to lure swing voters with wide 
social programs, such as social benefits (e.g., allowances for children) with wide accessibility. Over time, this can be 
noticed in the composition of public expenditure, the weight of social policy becoming larger. 
The situation is different in majoritarian systems. In order to win the elections, you need a majority of districts 
instead of a majority of voters. This gives rise to the swing district, rather than the swing voter. These are the 
districts where the social composition is such that preference for either side is not very strong. Geographical 
targeting becomes feasible, with Governments trying to win the favour of such districts by allocating more funds for 
local projects (roads, schools, etc) which simply implies that there are fewer funds for universal benefit programs. 
Again, as in the earlier case, in time, the weight of social policy in the overall budget is affected, this time, 
negatively.  
The incentives embedded in the details of voting rules generate behavior that systematically favors a certain policy 
outcome. In time, therefore, different institutions may be associated with different policies, despite similarity in 
preferences. 
To further substantiate this claim, Persson and Tabellini, embark on a vast empirical project, gathering data for an 
impressive number of countries.  
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Their aim is to show that even after introducing many of the most relevant drivers behind social expenditure, the 
type of electoral system a country has explains a non-trivial part of the variation in policy outcome.  
To do that, they indentify the dependent variable as the ratio of the sum of all expenditure on social programs 
(pensions, unemployment, social assistance, etc) divided by the country’s GDP. This represents an approximation of 
redistribution, the share of a country’s output allocated to social transfers.  
The main explanatory variable captures the difference in voting rules, either proportional or majoritarian.  
Their model is then completed by the operationalization of numerous other indicators that can be seen as potential 
explanations for social expenditure. For example, demographic variables are prominently featured as one can see a 
direct link between the proportion of people over 65 or below 15 years of age and the disbursements made by the 
Government on social programs. The list continues with numerous other variables, such as ethnic fractionalization, 
quality of democracy, population, income per capita, openness to trade, and many others. They all can be seen as 
explanations for the amount spent on redistribution, from cohesiveness or trust of society, to accountability of 
elected officials, the wealth of the nation, its vulnerability to shocks and so on.  
The results of their OLS regression with multiple specifications are presented below. The most obvious relation is 
indeed with the demographic variable, which is intuitive, this being a direct driver of public expenditure. However, 
it can be noted that the voting rules dummy (maj) points in the expected direction and is also statistically significant 
at the 10% level. 
Table 1. OLS results 
  (1) 
VARIABLES ssw 
maj -1.691*(-0.972) 
pres -0.154 (-1.119) 
gastil -0.711 (-0.553) 
lyp -0.118 (-0.865) 
trade 0.00809 (-0.00936) 
prop1564 -0.137 (-0.129) 
prop65 1.151*** (-0.155) 
federal -0.0454 (-1.253) 
Constant 8.965 (-8.307) 
Observations 69 
R-squared 0.792 
Further to these, in order to give more depth to the model, new preference variables have been derived from the 
World Values Survey. They are thought as ways to approximate social preferences towards inequality (INEQ), the 
responsibility of the government (GVR) and ideological self-identification (IDE).  
INEQ represents the proportion of the respondents that answered 1,2 or 3 on a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 stands for the 
statement “Income inequalities should be reduced”, and 10 for “We need greater inequalities as incentives for 
work”, respectively. GVR represents the proportion of the respondents that answered 1,2 or 3 on a 1 to 10 scale, 
where 1 stands for the statement “Government should take more responsibility”, and 10 for “The people should take 
more responsibility”, respectively. Finally, IDE represents the proportion of the respondents that answered 1, 2 or 3 
on a 1 to 10 scale, where 1 stands for “Left” and 10 for “Right”, respectively.   
It is safe to argue that countries where more people want income equality, greater government responsibility and 
label themselves as “leftists”, the preference for redistribution is higher. Therefore, holding these constant, we are 
isolating even more of the determinants of social expenditure. 
The results are presented below. 
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Table 2. Introducing preferences 
  (1) 
VARIABLES ssw 
maj =-3.98*(-2.095) 
pres -9.533***(-2.767) 
gastil -4.456**(-2.055) 
lyp -2.058(-2.815) 
trade 0.0171(-0.0232) 
prop1564 -0.0774(-0.309) 
prop65 0.398(-0.48) 
federal 0.533(-2.269) 
ineq 0.0516(-0.0751) 
gvr 0.0189(-0.0575) 
ide 0.334**(-0.145) 
Constant 35.35(-26.52) 
Observations 37 
R-squared 0.884 
We see that all the preference variables have the expected sign. More social expenditure is associated with countries 
where more people believe that government needs to take responsibility for welfare, that inequality needs to be 
reduced and label themselves as leftists. The latter is also statistically significant at the 5% confidence level. 
However, even taking out the effect of preferences, the electoral rules variable continues to be statistically 
significant. In other words, even when holding economic, social, demographic, geographic and historic 
characteristics of countries constant, as Persson and Tabellini did, and even when doing the same with preferences 
for social policy, the institution that sets the rules for election matters in what gets to be chosen. 
3. Conclusions 
This paper looked at the relation between institutions, behaviour and preferences by illustrating it with the particular 
case of voting rules and social policy.  
Institutions set limits to behaviour, they establish the rules of the game. They also have certain incentives embedded 
that agents tend to follow which gives indications of the outcomes of the game.  
In the case of voting systems, the rules that transform votes into mandates in parliament represent the function that 
aggregates individual preferences into collective decisions. But these rules can differ markedly, and so can the 
incentives they generate. One prominent example is the found by looking at the magnitude of electoral districts. The 
preference for general social programs, in multi-member districts found under proportional representation, results in 
more social spending relative to total public expenditure. The opposite is true for majoritarian systems where the 
incentive is rather to isolate crucial districts and lure them with spending on public goods.  
In order to prove this, an empirical model was used by Persson and Tabellini on a dataset including 69 countries and 
their most relevant characteristics thought to influence their social expenditure to GDP ratio. Their results are 
convincing, as voting rules do seem indeed to be determinant for redistribution. To further substantiate this, a 
number of variables approximating social preferences for redistribution have been derived from the World Values 
Survey. They all have the predicted sign, but what is most interesting is that the institutional variable continues to be 
statistically significant. What this seems to show is that, as the literature on institutionalism suggests, the rule 
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followed to aggregate individual preferences into collective decisions matters in what decisions get to be taken. 
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